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RANDALL P. BEZANSON* 
Is There Such A Thing As Too Much 
Free Speech? 
rom its beginning, the First Amendment speech guarantee has 
rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct and 
liberty versus utility. Free speech primarily protects the individual’s 
liberty to freely speak his or her mind. The boundaries of speech and 
liberty have rarely been breached, and when a breach has occurred, it 
has been very limited in its implications.1 
Until now, that is. 
Over the past fifteen or so years, the Supreme Court has 
significantly broadened the definitional scope, or coverage, of the 
speech guarantee. It has breached the line between speech and 
conduct and the central premise of speech as an individual liberty. In 
the process it has transformed speech freedom from one aimed at 
protecting individuals into a protection for corporations2 and 
government,3 too. When it comes to speech, the Rehnquist and 
Roberts courts’ opinions have been “the more the merrier.” 
In 1994, Stanley Fish, a peripatetic and controversial scholar then 
at Duke, published a book titled, There’s No Such Thing as Free 
 
* David H. Vernon Professor of Law, University of Iowa. This essay is drawn in part 
from a book that Professor Bezanson has written, and which will be released in October of 
2012: Too Much Free Speech? Copyright 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the University 
of Illinois. Used with permission of the University of Illinois Press. 
1 E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 
(1989). 
2 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
3 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
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Speech: And It’s a Good Thing, Too.4 It was the free part of free 
speech that he challenged. His claim was that as speakers we are 
trapped by our politics and predispositions; what we say inside the 
safe realm cannot be called free. Speech that might rightly count as 
free—speech outside of the dominant domain at a point in time, like 
hate speech or obscene art or blasphemy—often doesn’t count as 
speech. It is instead outside the domain of acceptable discourse, 
indeed often illegal. Thus, there is no such thing as free speech. 
Taking the opposite stance, Justice Scalia in 2003 penned a spirited 
separate opinion in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 
which challenged the McCain-Feingold campaign finance act.5 There, 
he famously wrote that in American democracy “there is no such 
thing as too much speech.”6 For Justice Scalia, it seems, speech is a 
political and individual good in and of itself, a largely benign force—
not, as Fish would have it, because it doesn’t rattle the cage, but 
instead because it does. Justice Scalia is neither an absolutist nor a 
pure libertarian. There are limits: trees and polar bears, he has said, 
have no free speech rights;7 speech that is imminently coupled with 
illegal conduct can be prohibited. But beyond that, he sees a free 
world of opinion, and ideas, even hateful ones, falling outside of 
Fish’s speakable domains. 
The question Fish and Scalia raise is the meaning of the term 
“speech” and its relation to “speaking.” It is a matter, in short, of the 
First Amendment’s coverage, not its standard of protection. And it is 
the amendment’s coverage that the Court has recently focused on and, 
in the process, expanded dramatically and fundamentally. 
But might the Court be wrong to extend First Amendment 
protections to conduct not typically thought of as “speech” and to 
sources not ordinarily thought of as “speakers”? Is it possible to have 
too much free speech? 
Yes. 
For purposes of this essay I will focus on five recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court. The first is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
 
4 STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD 
THING, TOO, (1994). 
5 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 247–64 (2003) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
6 Id. at 259. 
7 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct 876, 928 (2010) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
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Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.8 In Hurley, a private 
parade organizer for the St. Patrick’s Day-Evacuation Day parade in 
Boston excluded a gay and lesbian group’s participation in the parade. 
The Supreme Court held that the organizer had a First Amendment 
right to exclude, notwithstanding Massachusetts law, because forced 
inclusion would affect the “message” of the parade. But what was the 
organizer’s intended message for the parade? What was the source of 
the message? As it turns out, the Supreme Court held that the 
organizer did not have to have a message that it intended to 
communicate through the parade. The “message” of the parade came 
from the event itself, the audience, and the function of a parade as a 
social ritual. In short, there was no “speaker.” There was just meaning 
perceived by members of the audience. This was enough to qualify as 
“speech” under the First Amendment—as long as, Justice Scalia 
would later say, it doesn’t include trees or polar bears.9 
The second case, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, involved the Boy 
Scouts of America firing an assistant scoutmaster once it became 
known that he was gay.10 Discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was illegal, so the Boy Scouts claimed that the law violated the 
Scouts’ free speech. There was a problem with the Scouts’ theory, 
though: the Scouts hadn’t spoken a word, nor were they forbidden 
from speaking whatever they wanted. Instead, they argued, the 
discrimination law, if they obeyed it and didn’t fire the Scoutmaster, 
would force them to appear to favor gays in the Scout ranks and thus 
to “speak” a message of approval or acceptance that they didn’t want 
to express. Of course, they didn’t want to state the opposite message 
of non-acceptance either. They just wanted to keep their mouths shut. 
Ultimately, the Boy Scouts’ refusal to speak made them speakers, the 
Court held. But where is the speech? And more basically, where is the 
speaker, the individual intending to exercise the constitutional right to 
speak his or her mind? What the Court branded “speech” had a 
 
8 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 
557 (1995). 
9 Apparently, fully independent computer programs may also be excluded from the 
“perceived meaning” as “speech” theory of First Amendment activity. See EUGENE 
VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR SEARCH ENGINE 
SEARCH RESULTS (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055364; Frank Pasquale, 
Automated Arrangement of Information: Speech, Conduct, and Power, BALKINIZATION 
(June 25, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/06/tim-wus-opinion-piece-on-speech-and 
.html.  
10 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
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message, but no author. It emerged out of thin air, like the wind 
through the trees or the roar of the polar bear. 
The third case, Doe v. Reed, involved a signature on a referendum 
petition under Washington State law.11 The State decided to release 
the names of all signatories on an anti-gay marriage referendum 
petition. The problem with the plaintiff’s First Amendment argument 
was that the signature was a vote—conduct and not speech. Since the 
beginning of the republic, voting has been open and public,12 and in 
common experience, voting is an act, not speech to an audience. We 
have to sign our names on applications for drivers’ licenses and 
countless other forms of government assistance. When public 
employees, like faculty, vote for or against a candidate or a new 
course, they do not have to do so in private. 
But the Supreme Court held that the act of signing, or voting, was 
an “expressive” act protected by the First Amendment. Like the 
Scouts’ refusal to speak, the decision to vote is speech even though 
not intended as such; indeed, in Doe, like the Boy Scouts case, the 
speaker quite explicitly did not intend to speak or wish to speak. Does 
a person’s mere act constitute speech if others give it meaning? Then 
surely the same can be said about trees or polar bears, right? 
The Supreme Court’s fourth case involved a decision by a city in 
Utah to place a monument with the Ten Commandments in a public 
park, but its refusal to do so for Summum, a very small religious sect, 
and its monument.13 Why? Because city officials didn’t like 
Summum and disagreed with its ideas. Normally, when government 
decides not to allow someone to speak simply because it doesn’t like 
the ideas, the First Amendment enters the fray with full force. 
Government can’t do that. But in the Summum case, the Supreme 
Court approved the city’s decision because the decision about what 
goes in a public park is just one instance of a new doctrine called 
“government speech.” 
When government speaks—which it does a lot—it is immune 
under the First Amendment speech guarantee from any limitation 
based on excluding a private speaker because it doesn’t like his or her 
ideas, or from restricting government programs and funds for private 
speakers because the government doesn’t approve of their speech. 
This immunity from First Amendment challenge applies, thankfully, 
 
11 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010). 
12 The secret ballot is a state law matter only. Id. at 2834 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
13 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
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only when the government is speaking, as opposed to regulating. But 
that’s a pretty slippery line to draw. Who decides whether the 
government’s restriction of private speech is protected by the 
government speech doctrine? Why, the government, of course. 
The final case is the Citizens United case.14 There, the Court held 
that in political or public issue settings, corporations are speakers just 
like individuals. That is, corporations have the same liberty to speak 
under the First Amendment. But who is the corporation? Not, for 
these purposes, the shareholders or owners or investors or employees, 
but instead the artificial legally-created entity itself, abstracted from 
such parties and interests. As Chief Justice Rehnquist was wont to 
say, corporations have no mind or free will of their own. They are not 
people or individuals with liberty.15 They are like polar bears. But his 
view didn’t prevail. Corporations and other groups, as groups, now 
have a freedom to speak under the First Amendment that is every bit 
the same as that of liberty-bearing individuals. 
The Supreme Court in these cases has breached the line between 
individual liberty and utilitarian value, and the line between speech—
intended expression of meaning—and conduct. Corporations are now 
liberty-bearing speakers, and what was formerly their conduct—
spending money on politics, for example—is now speech. The act of 
firing a person, sponsoring a parade, even voting, if given meaning by 
others, is speech. A government decision to reject a monument, or to 
grant or deny an applicant, is speech by government. These are 
changes at a fundamental level. They have consequences that 
transcend the current partisan dissatisfaction with corporations as big 
political spenders exercising their freedom. 
Between Stanley Fish’s claim that there really is no free speech and 
Justice Scalia’s view that we can’t get enough of it lie difficult and 
largely definitional puzzles that require us to ask what limits should 
apply to the Supreme Court in its singular capacity of creator, 
interpreter, and enforcer of the free speech guarantee. There are many 
potential costs involved in expanding the meaning of “speech” and 
the scope of its freedom: costs of assuming that free speech is a 
quantitative good, not, as Stanley Fish would have it, a qualitative 
one; costs in subverting principle; costs to the structural 
characteristics of government and the Constitution; costs to the 
 
14 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
15 Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
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separation of powers; costs to the independence and scope of judicial 
power; costs to government’s practical capacity to achieve important 
ends and formulate important policy. 
The recent uproar following the Court’s extension of First 
Amendment protection to corporate political speech has rested almost 
entirely on personal political, economic, and ideological grounds. 
This is, of course, fair enough in a democracy. But the fact is that we 
don’t expect the Supreme Court Justices to make decisions based on 
our, or their, personal preferences. We would—or at least we 
should—be shocked if the Court were to announce that it would 
reconsider the case because of the overwhelming public sentiment 
against it. The Supreme Court is politically independent and it is a 
constitution that the Justices are interpreting,16 one that binds all of 
government and all of the rest of us. 
So when we explore the Court’s First Amendment decisions, we 
must ask not whether the decisions rest on an interpretation of the 
Constitution with which we disagree, but instead whether the way the 
Court conducted itself in its search for meaning was fitting for the 
independent judicial branch and consistent with the larger 
constitutional expectations that should surround the power claimed by 
the non-elected, secure, intellectually elite, and independent judicial 
branch in a representative democracy. The Supreme Court is a unique 
institution in our democracy: independent, small, intellectually elite, 
charged with the power and duty to enforce law and the Constitution, 
and committed to openness, reason, prudence, and consistency in the 
exercise of its power. With the First Amendment especially, it is 
obliged as the almost single-handed creator, interpreter, and enforcer 
of freedom of speech to engage in full and independent reasoning 
from the constitutional text applied faithfully over time and based on 
principles that transcend any particular case. Its opinions, to be sure, 
are not always pretty. With nine fully independent minds, getting five 
votes to form a majority in difficult cases can be a challenge, as the 
existence of multiple concurrences and dissents often signifies. But 
the practice of multiple opinions is a piece of the Court’s commitment 
to open public reason by each Justice. This is an expectation that 
cannot be breached by a branch whose stock in trade, constitutionally 
speaking, is principled and full reason. 
My own conclusion about the Court’s fidelity to its constitutional 
responsibilities is mixed. My aim, however, is not simply to supply 
 
16 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). 
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my conclusion, but to arm the reader with the capacity to reach her or 
his own decisions. The issue, after all, is not strictly speaking a 
“legal” one. It’s a constitutional one with which every citizen should 
be concerned, for it goes to the form of government we have in 
America and the way in which it should operate. This is a matter on 
which all of us can and should have informed opinions. 
The Supreme Court’s decisions have expanded the protection of 
the First Amendment, from speech by individuals, to conduct, to 
corporations, and to government. Doesn’t that seem to turn the First 
Amendment upside down? Shouldn’t the First Amendment be 
protecting us from them, not them from us? 
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